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ABSTRACT
This paper not only recommends means whereby principal-agent problems could be addressed,  
but also considers various ways in which the external auditor and audit committees contribute as  
corporate governance tools. The impact of bank regulations on risk taking and the need for a  
consideration  of  ownership  structures  are  amongst  other  issues  which  are  considered.  In  
acknowledging  the  issues  raised  by  ownership  structures,  it  considers  theories  such  as  the  
banking theory and corporate governance theory. It also considers other alternatives whereby 
risk taking could be controlled.  In recommending the external  auditor’s expertise  to address  
principal agent problems, it draws attention to the audit committee’s roles, both as a vital and  
complementary corporate governance tool. It also highlights the importance of measures which 
need  to  be  in  place  if  the  external  auditor’s  contribution  to  corporate  governance  is  to  be  
maximised. 
Key  Words:  corporate  governance,  banking  theory,  risk,  ownership  structures,  auditor, 
disclosure, principal, agent, regulation, moral hazard
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The Role of External Auditors in Corporate Governance: Agency Problems 
and the Management of Risk
Marianne Ojo1
A. Introduction
Corporate  governance,  the  process  whereby  directors  of  a  company  are  monitored  and 
controlled,2 involves decision making, accountability and monitoring.3  Two aspects which are 
considered  to  be  fundamental  to  corporate  governance  are:4 Supervision  and  monitoring  of 
management performance (the enterprise aspect) and ensuring accountability of management to 
shareholders and other stakeholders (the accountability aspect).
Three key themes which are  considered to  have emerged from lessons  learned from various 
corporate  collapses  are:5 emphasis  on  “substance  of  the  transaction”6 rather  than  legal  form, 
transparency and the management  of risk.  Since (in my opinion),  the management  of risk is 
considered to have the greatest impact and significance in the fields of regulation and corporate 
governance, amongst these three themes, it will constitute the starting point and the focus of the 
study. The topic will, in part, be considered by way of reference to the impact of regulations on 
risk taking and the need for a consideration of ownership structures. Subsequent sections will 
consider not only the contribution of audit committees to corporate governance, but also illustrate 
why the presence of such bodies is  vital  to ensuring accountability and supervision within a 
company.  In highlighting why the external auditor is such an indispensable  tool in corporate 
governance, the final section of this paper will attempt to demonstrate how the external auditor 
can help to resolve agency problems - whilst emphasising the audit committee’s significance in 
complementing the external auditor’s work.
B. Management of Risk
I. Impact of Bank Regulations on Risk Taking
Whilst the application of bank regulations could lead to lower levels of risk taking, it could also 
induce higher levels of risk taking.7 Lower levels of risk taking may occur where owners are 
compelled to invest more of their personal wealth in the bank and the converse may occur where 
capital requirements do not compel owners to invest more of their wealth in the bank – although 
1School of Social Sciences and Law, Oxford Brookes University. Email: marianneojo@brookes.ac.uk
2 Cadbury Committee defines it as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled” 
3 See D Broadley, ‘Auditing and its Role in Corporate Governance’ 2006 Bank For International Settlements FSI 
Seminar on Corporate Governance for Banks
4 See V Beattie, S Fearnley and R Brandt, Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About (ICAEW) at 
page 26
5 See House of Commons, Select Committee on Treasury, Minutes of Evidence  (2002/03 Session) Appendix 6 
Memorandum by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmtrdind/439/439ap07.htm  (last visited 29 June 2009)
6 See particularly Financial Reporting Standard 5 “ Reporting the Substance of Transactions”
7 L Laeven and R Levine, ‚Bank Governance, Regulations and Risk Taking’ 2008 at page 4
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they might encourage greater levels of capital to be generated.8 However Laeven and Levine add 
that since the relationship between risk and regulation is critically dependent on individual banks’ 
ownership structures, with the effect that the relationship between regulation and bank risk can 
vary according to ownership structure, a consideration of the impact of ownership structures is 
necessary in order to present a more accurate analysis of bank risk taking.9 Further, they illustrate 
their  assertion  through  a  demonstration  of  how  ownership  structure  associates  with  bank 
regulations to impact the risk taking behaviour of individual banks.10The following theories are 
considered:
• That the effect of regulation on risk is dependent on the relative influence of owners who 
exist within governance structures of individual banks 
• That bank regulators influence risk taking incentives of owners in a different manner to 
those of managers (banking theory),
• That  ownership  structures  affect  the  ability  of  owners  to  influence  risk  (corporate 
governance theory)
By merging the theories, they arrive at the conclusion that:11
Firstly, owners who have “diversified” their assets have greater incentives to indulge in higher 
levels of risk taking than managers who are non shareholders and that as a result, banks which 
have powerful and diversified owners are more likely to be riskier than “widely held banks” – 
provided  other  factors  are  constantly  maintained.  Secondly,  bank regulations  such  as  capital 
requirements and deposit insurance, generate effects which differ when considered in relation to 
incentives of owners as opposed to that of managers and that as a result, the “comparative power 
of  shareholders  relative  to  managers  within  each  bank’s  corporate  governance  structure” 
influences the real impact of regulations on risk taking.
In response to questions such as: i) why the corporate form of organization consisting of “widely 
diffuse” ownership is so common - given the existence of “positive agency costs”12 ii) why the 
growth of equity in such organisations  has been immense and iii)  why many individuals  are 
willing to entrust a huge proportion of their wealth to be managed by people with little interest in 
their welfare, Jensen and Meckling refer to the argument put forward by Manne13, Alchian and 
Demsetz14, namely, that the advantage of the corporate form (by way of sole proprietorships or 
8 See ibid; Also see D Kim and A Santomero, ‚Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation’ 1994 Journal of Finance 43 
at 1219-1233
9 L Laeven and R Levine, ‚Bank Governance, Regulations and Risk Taking’ 2008 Journal of Financial Economics at 
page 6
10 ibid at page 5
11  See ibid 
12 In  Jensen  and  Meckling’s  view,  “The  existence  and  size  of  the  agency  costs  depends  on  the  nature  of  the 
monitoring costs, the tastes of managers for non-pecuniary benefits and the supply of potential managers who are
capable of financing the entire venture out of their personal wealth. If monitoring costs are zero, agency costs will be 
zero or  if  there  are  enough 100 percent  owner-managers  available to  own and run all  the firms in  an industry 
(competitive or not) then agency costs in that industry will also be zero”. See M Jensen and W Meckling „Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” 1976 at pages 34 and 35 of 78
13 HG Manne, „Our Two Corporate Systems: Law and Economics“ 1967 Virginia Law Review 53 at pages 259-284
14 A Alchian and H Demsetz “Production, Information Costs and Economic Organisation” 1972
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partnerships)  is  attributable  to  the  limited  liability  of  equity  claims.15 However  Jensen  and 
Meckling are of the opinion that such argument does not provide sufficient explanation since 
limited liability is considered just to be a means of transferring basic risk – and not eliminating 
it.16 One of their solutions to the puzzling questions is that the key lies with transaction costs.17 
The  existence  of  unlimited  liability,  in  their  view,  would  place  cost  obligations  (related 
monitoring liabilities and wealth of other owners) on shareholders and that such costs would be 
much  higher  than  payment  obligations  of  a  premium  consisting  of  higher  interest  rates  to 
creditors of the company (in return for an acceptance of a contract which would accord limited 
liability to shareholders).18 
John, Saunders and Senbet19 contend that focussing bank regulations on bank capital ratios may 
prove to be an ineffective means of controlling risk taking. They seek to address the issue by 
recommending a more direct mechanism which would not only impact incentives in bank risk 
taking, but which also illustrates that bank owners select an “optimal management compensation 
structure” that compels the bank’s management to make optimal choices.20
II. Effective Audit Committees - Role of the Audit Committee in Corporate Governance
According  to  Article  1  paragraph  24  of  the  2006  Directive  on  Statutory  Audits,21 audit 
committees  and  an  effective  internal  control  system  not  only  help  to  minimise  financial, 
operational and compliance risks, but also “enhance the quality of financial reporting.” 
As well as playing a fundamental role in transmitting financial results to the general public, the 
audit committee serves as representative of shareholder interests and is required to facilitate a 
process whereby management, external auditors and the chief executive can be questioned and 
held to account22 - if need be. The audit committee is not only responsible for monitoring the 
financial  reporting process,  but also the effectiveness  of the company’s  internal  controls,  the 
internal audit – where applicable, and risk management systems.23 It is also assigned with the task 
of monitoring the statutory audit of the annual and consolidated accounts. The audit committee 
contribution in facilitating the fulfilment of the external auditor’s role in corporate governance 
will be considered in the following section.
15 M Jensen and W Meckling „Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” 
1976 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper.taf?ABSTRACT_ID=94043>  at page 35 of 78  Also see Journal of 
Financial Economics Volume 3 No 4 at pages 305 -360
16 See ibid at page 36 of 78
17 ibid
18 As a result, the creditors would assume risk liability for any non payment of debts – should bankruptcy occur; ibid
19 See K John, A Saunders and LW Senbet, ‘A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation’  The 
Review of Financial Studies 2000 Volume 13 No 1 at pages 95-125
20 ibid at page 95
21 Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on statutory audits of annual accounts and 
consolidated accounts amending Council Directives 78/ 660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and repealing Council Directive 
84/253/EEC
22 S Green, Sarbanes Oxley and the Board of Directors: Techniques and Best Practices for Corporate Governance  
2005 John Wiley and Sons at page 66
23 See Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on statutory audits of annual accounts 
and consolidated accounts, Article 41(2) (a) and (b)
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C. Contribution of External Auditors in Helping to Resolve Agency Problems. 
Corporate governance aims to resolve problems which arise from the principal-agent relationship, 
whereby owners have an interest in maximising the value of their shares – whereas managers 
tend to be more interested in “the private consumption of firm resources and the growth of the 
firm”.24 It addresses such problems through the contract  drafting process and others measures 
which are developed.25 One measure which could contribute to corporate governance efforts in 
addressing the agency problem is the external auditor’s involvement. Such involvement will be 
discussed  in  part,  with  reference  to  the  Sarbanes  Oxley  Act’s  contribution  to  corporate 
governance. As of now, the engagement of the external auditor as a means of addressing agency 
problems will be considered.
Even though monitoring costs – unlike agency costs, cannot be avoided (as is the case with 100% 
owner management scenarios), they could be minimised. The external auditor would facilitate a 
situation whereby managers are encouraged or compelled to be held more accountable. Through 
an  appropriate  application  of  accounting  policies,  the  external  auditor  could  help  facilitate  a 
position  whereby  creative  accounting  practices  and  hyper  inflation/inflation  of  figures  are 
discouraged.  Penalties  could  be  imposed  on  managers  and  directors  who  intentionally  or 
recklessly inflate or manipulate accounting figures and financial statements. Such penalties could 
arise in the form of a reduction of such managers’ (and directors’) annual bonuses , remuneration 
or even pensions. The likelihood of a qualified audit opinion (as regards the auditor’s findings on 
the financial  statements)  is considered to be less effective as a deterrent  to such managers  – 
particularly where an individual manager or few managers are responsible for fraudulent related 
acts. 
Apportionment of liability on a proportionate basis would also produce a more equitable result – 
than is the case where a qualified opinion is issued by the auditor. The financial audit remains an 
important aspect of corporate governance that makes management accountable to shareholders 
for its stewardship of a company.26 In this regard, attention is drawn to the importance of audit 
committees. Audit committees do not only serve as internal monitoring devices which support 
good  corporate  governance,  they  are  also  considered  to  be  mechanisms  of  ensuring  that  an 
appropriate  relationship  exists  between  the  auditor  and  the  management  whose  financial 
statements are being audited.27 Prior to corporate governance reforms in many jurisdictions, the 
pressures faced by external auditors from directors in many firms constituted the focus of several 
major issues. Furthermore “creative accounting” practices were widespread. The audit serves as a 
signalling mechanism to shareholders of a company that information provided by the company’s 
24 See S Vitols, ‚Corporate Governance versus Economic Governance: Banks and Industrial Restructuring in the US 
and Germany’ 1995 < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=607641> (last visited 14 January 2011)
25 See ibid
26 S Fearnley and V Beattie, Auditor Independence and Non-audit Services: a Literature Review (2002) at page 1 
ICAEW, London 
27 See V Beattie, S Fearnley and R Brandt, Behind Closed Doors: What the Company Audit is Really About (Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 2001) at page 29; Also see Cadbury Report 1992 
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directors can be relied upon. Auditing standards have a role to play in ensuring that factors such 
as objectivity, integrity and independence, factors which are essentially in the external auditor’s 
performance  of  his  responsibilities,  are  respected.  However  attention  has  been  drawn to  the 
importance of other issues such as enforcement and disclosure standards:
“The quality  of  reported  financial  information,  however,  is  influenced  not  simply by the quality of  accounting 
standards,  but  also by other  institutional  factors  [corporate  governance,  the legal  system, and the existence  and 
enforcement  of laws governing investor protection and disclosure standards]  that affect  the demand for and the 
supply of financial information.”28
The crucial role played by enforcement in investor protection laws and disclosure standards in 
corporate governance has also been highlighted.29 It is contended that investor ownership is not 
only likely to be diffuse, but that ownership is likely to be distinct from control in common law 
countries.30 For effective enforcement to take place, shareholder litigation and bankruptcy laws 
may be vital routes to ensuring that investor rights are protected.31
According to Hopt32, an improvement of corporate governance in Europe, in the aftermath of 
Enron would require the involvement of intermediaries such as external auditors. Furthermore, he 
notes that the control of the Board by auditors is not only the “most common”, but also the “most 
prominent control mechanism”33.
Restrictions on the outsourcing of any internal audit functions to a client firm’s external auditor, a 
consequence of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, is attributed to independence concerns.34 
According to Abbott and others, outsourcing routine internal audit activities not only constitutes a 
threat  to  external  auditor’s  independence  – given  its  repetitive  nature,  but  could  also impair 
internal  audit  independence  and  generate  disagreements  relating  to  financial  reporting  and 
internal control issues between the external auditor and management.35 Arguments for engaging 
28 See GG Mueller ‘The Role of Financial Reporting’ at page 109 
<http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/conf/conf44/cf44_8.pdf>  (last visited 14 January 2011) and also SP Kotheri, 
‘The role of financial reporting in reducing financial risks in the 
market’http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/conf/conf44/cf44_6.pdf 
29 Ibid; For further information on the impact of regulations and disclosure requirements on risk taking levels, please 
refer to M Ojo, „The Impact of Capital and Disclosure Requirements on Risks and Risk Taking Incentives“ 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1547023> and http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/20404/1/MPRA_paper_20404.pdf and also M Ojo, „Preparing for Basel IV : why liquidity risks still 
present a challenge to regulators in prudential supervision (II)“ <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27778/> and 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1732304>
30 See SP Kotheri, ‘The role of financial reporting in reducing financial risks in the market’ at page 99 
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/conf/conf44/cf44_6.pdf 
31 ibid
32 K Hopt, ‘Modern Company and Capital Market Problems: Improving European Corporate Governance After
Enron’ CGI Law Working Paper No. 05/2002 at page 476 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=356102>
33 ibid at page 497
34 See Abbott and others, ‘Corporate Governance, Audit Quality and the Sarbanes Oxley Act: Evidence from Internal 
Audit Outsourcing’2007 at page1
35 see ibid at page 2 and page 12
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the external auditor to undertake non routine tasks include the fact that non routine tasks are not 
only non repetitive by nature, they also require specialised knowledge which internal auditors 
may not be able to acquire in house.36 Further, the use of external auditors in performing non 
routine tasks may be more efficient.37
Safeguards which exist to ensure that threats to auditor’s independence are mitigated include: 
prohibitions, restrictions, policies, procedures and the requirement for disclosures.38 As a means 
of  achieving  maximum degree  of  harmonisation,  EU member  states  are  permitted  to  impose 
additional national audit procedures or requirements.39 
Furthermore, Article 22 paragraph 1of the Directive40 states that “Member States shall ensure that 
when carrying out a statutory audit, the statutory auditor and/or the audit firm is independent of 
the audited entity and is not involved in the decision-taking of the audited entity.” Where any 
direct or indirect financial or business relationship exists between the statutory auditor, audit firm 
or branch of audit firm and the audited firm(and this includes the provision of additional non 
audit services), and an “objective, reasonable and informed third party” would deduce that the 
statutory auditor’s independence is being compromised, member states are required to ensure that 
such a statutory auditor or audit  firm does not perform the audit.41 In response to a situation 
whereby the external auditor is affected by threats,42 the statutory auditor is required to ensure 
that safeguards aimed at mitigating such threats are applied.43
D. Conclusion
External auditors can impact the risk taking incentives of management through an appropriate 
application of accounting policies. However, it is also important to ensure that rules (in the event 
of  a  breach  of  accounting  polices)are  correspondingly  enforced.  The  external  auditor’s 
responsibilities  and  the  audit  committee’s  role  in  corporate  governance  are  fundamental 
complements  in helping to achieve the desired aims of corporate  governance.  Safeguards are 
36 ibid at page 3
37 Other advantages which have been identified in engaging the external auditor’s expertise – as opposed to that of an 
outside service provider include: i) Synergies which are derived from “knowledge spillovers” between the 
outsourcing of particular audits and which would generate a more comprehensive financial statement audit; ii) the 
fact that the external auditor’s knowledge of the client’s accounting systems and functions facilitates collaborative 
efforts between the internal and external auditors – which in turn generates greater efficiency; and that iii) the 
external auditor’s knowledge of the client’s accounting systems could also reduce the risk of “budget overruns”. See 
ibid at page 16
38 See Article 1 paragraph 11 Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on statutory 
audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts
39 Only where these can be attributed to specific national legal requirements which are related to the scope of the 
statutory audit of annual or consolidated accounts – which implies that those requirements should not have been 
covered by international auditing standards which have been adopted ; see ibid at Article 1 paragraph 13
40 Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on statutory audits of annual accounts and 
consolidated accounts
41 See paragraph 2
42 For example, self-review, self interest, advocacy, familiarity, or trust and intimidation threats
43 See ibid; Where the significance of the threats, in comparison to the applied safeguards is such that external 
auditor’s independence is compromised, the auditor is required not to undertake the statutory audit; paragraph 2. 
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necessary to  ensure  that  the external  auditor’s  expertise  is  maximised.  Even though external 
auditors  play  a  vital  role  in  corporate  governance,  through  their  involvement  and  their 
examination of financial statement and accounting policies44, several areas continue to give rise to 
problems. IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standard) 32 and 39, two reporting standards 
which deal with off-balance sheet instruments and which created problems in the Parmalat and 
Enron cases,  still  constitute  a challenge  for the IASB. Off  balance  sheet  instruments  created 
problems in  the afore mentioned cases owing to  the fact  that  they were not  reflected  in  the 
balance sheet – even though their sizes could have been as large as two to three times global 
GDP. The IASB will also face further challenges of reconciling these standards at a global level – 
with the US in particular. Further challenges also include contentious circumstances which exist 
under financial reporting standards and bank rules. Under IFRS 32 what may be referred to as 
equity may not be permitted under bank regulation.
44 For further problems, including the difficulty of comprehending complex products, see S Green, Sarbanes Oxley  
and the Board of Directors: Techniques and Best Practices for Corporate Governance  2005 John Wiley and Sons at 
page 66
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